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Introduction

In the analysis of models of competitive markets under uncertainty, diﬀerent
approaches can be distinguished. One approach, typically dealt with in welfare
economics, is the speciﬁcation of environmental conditions that are suﬃcient for
the existence of equilibrium prices, with all the corollary implications for the
eﬃciency of the competitive system. Prominent examples of this approach are
the works of Arrow [2], Debreu [3] and Radner [12]. Another approach, typical
to the analysis of capital markets, is concerned more with the structure of equilibrium prices, rather than their existence. Under this approach, basic interest
lies in the implications of various given assumptions about the preferences of
individuals (e.g. risk aversion) on the relationship between various properties
of capital assets and their equilibrium prices, which are initially assumed to
exist. Such studies extend from the classical investigations, such as Hicks [6]
and Lutz [10], on the term to maturity of “riskless” capital assets, to recent
ones concerned primarily with the issue of risk, such as Sharpe [13], Lintner [9],
Hirshleifer [7,8] and others.1
The present study represents an attempt at a slightly diﬀerent approach.
We postulate the existence of equilibrium prices for capital assets under uncertainty, and then proceed to analyze the properties implicit in their deﬁnition. It
is shown that some results can be derived without recourse to the way individuals make decisions, their detailed preferences or their subjective assessments of
probabilities.
∗ The

author appreciates the must useful comments of two referees.

1 For

example, see also Diamond [4], Green [5], and Myers [11] - all using the same ArrowDebreu framework of uncertainty used here.
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Deﬁnition of Prospects and Their Worth

We shall use the“state-space description of uncertainty”2 of Arrow [2] and Debreu ([3], ch. 7). The set of (future) time points of interest is denoted by T
and for simplicity of exposition is assumed ﬁnite. The state space S = {s} is
partitioned for any t ∈ T into non empty sets eit i = 1...Kt , called “events at
t” (K0 = 1). If τ > t then the partition corresponding to τ is ﬁner than the
partition for t. Contracts for streams of cash ﬂows, to be called here “prospects”
are deﬁned by a (possibly
explicit but usually implicit) speciﬁcation of the set
 
of (dollar) values z eit for all t ∈ T , i = 1...Kt .
The set Z of all conceivable prospects may be considered as a real vector
space by the usual rules of addition
 and scalar
  multiplication, namely z =
az 1 eit + bz 2 eit for all t ∈ T, i = 1...Kt . The
az 1 + bz 2 if and only if z eit =
Kt .
dimension of Z is clearly K =
t∈T

Our basic objective is to analyze the structure of equilibrium prices for
prospects, as implied by essentially only equilibrium properties. Thus we are
not concerned here with conditions for the existence of these prices, nor do we
assume that prospects, as deﬁned above, are the actual domain of individual
preferences. We therefore choose as a starting point the assumption that equilibrium prices exist for all conceivable prospects. Formally, let the functional q
be deﬁned on Z so that, for any z ∈ Z, q (z) denotes the “worth” of prospect
z. Worth is deﬁned as the equilibrium price when the market is completely
informed about the prospect speciﬁcation of all contracts. The functional q will
be called the “cost of capital”.3
It is well known that equilibrium properties require that the functional q be
linear. Any linear functional deﬁned on Z can be represented by a set of values
  i

q et , t ∈ T, i = 1...Kt ,
to be called here “elementary prices”, so that for any z ∈ Z
q (z) =

Kt

   
z eit q eit ;
t∈T

...(2.1)

i=1

 
q eit is to be interpreted as “the equilibrium price at time 0 of the right to
$1 to be delivered at time t if and only if eit obtains”.
2 To emphasize that we do not assume the state-space framework to be the basis for investors’ preferences or decisions, we deliberately avoid the term “state preference model ”
frequently used in the literature.
3 We shall show in section III how this terminology ﬁts with the conventional concept of
the “cost of capital” as a number, or percentage, indicating a “rate of interest”.
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The Structure of the Cost of Capital

The determination of the worth of any given prospect is in principle a matter
for observation—one simply has to go to the market and ﬁnd out. It may
still be of interest to evaluate the worth of a prospect z by inference from
the worth of other prospects. Conceptually,
   this problem is also trivial: one
from market data,
has to evaluate the elementary prices q eit (by

 inference)
determine the detailed prospect representation z eit , and then compute q (z)
as in equation (2.1). Computationally, the dimension K of the space Z is a
serious problem. It is thus a question of interest whether the worth of a prospect
can be evaluated through the use of a smaller amount of data. Essentially, we
want to search for “suﬃcient statistics” for the evaluation of worth. The analysis
of the worth functional will provide interesting insight in this direction. We shall
ﬁrst concentrate on prospects involving only a single (uncertain) cash ﬂow. Such
prospects will be denoted by zt , the notation implying that
 
zt eiτ = 0 for all τ = t, i = 1...Kτ .

...(3.0.1)

Note that any prospect is the sum of prospects involving only a single cash
ﬂow, and thus no genreality is lost.

3.1

The Riskless Interest Rate

Consider a contract for the delivery of $1 at time t with certainty. The prospect
representation of this contract is as follows:
 
zt eiτ = 1 for τ = t, i = 1...Kτ ,
= 0 for τ = t, i = 1...Kτ .
Denoting the worth of this special contract by ρ0 (t), we have
ρ0 (t) =

Kt

 
q eit .

...(3.1.1)

i=1

If we denote by i0t the interest rate at time 0 for riskless loans with maturity
at t, we have by deﬁnition
ρ0 (t) =

3.2

1

t.

(1 + i0t )

...(3.1.2)

The Certainty Equivalent

Consider any single cash ﬂow prospect zt . Equation (2.1) may be rewritten as
 
Kt

 
q eit
zt eit .
q (zt ) = ρ0 (t)
ρ0 (t)
i=1

...(3.2.1)
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q eit
= ν eit ,
ρ0 (t)

Let

and thus
q (zt ) = ρ0 (t)

Kt


   
ν eit zt eit ;

...(3.2.2)

i=1

 
ν eit is the ratio of the present worth of $1 at time t contingent on event eit
to the present worth of $1 at time t with certainty. This may be safely assumed
non-negative, and together with (3.1.1) we have for all t
 
ν eit  0, i = 1...Kt ,
Kt


 
ν eit = 1.

i=1

It will be convenient to let also
Kt


   
ν eit zt eit = C (zt ) ,

...(3.2.3)

i=1

so that
q (zt ) = ρ0 (t) C (zt ) .

...(3.2.4)
 i
C (zt ) is thus a weighted average
of the values zt et that the prospect zt
 
can take, where the weights ν eit are determined by the market (since they are
completely deﬁned by q). The worth of any cash ﬂow zt is equal by (3.2.4) to
C (zt ) discounted at the riskless discount factor, or equivalently to the worth of
a riskless cash ﬂow C (zt ) to be delivered at the same time. It is thus natural
to call C (zt ) the certainty equivalent of zt , and consider the worth of zt as
composed of a pure time factor ρ0 (t) and a certainty equivalent embodying all
risks involved in zt .

3.3

An Exogenous Probability Measure

Individuals will generally diﬀer in their assessments of the probabilities of the
events eit that may obtain at time t. It is therefore meaningless to consider a
“market probability measure” on the state space S.
 
One may be tempted at this point to coniser the weights ν eit as surrogate
 
market probabilities. This fails, however, because the markets’ weights ν eit
need not (and generally will not) satisfy a basic requirement of a probability
measure, namely that for any t and τ (τ > t)
if

n

∪

i=m

eiτ = ejt

then

n

i=m

 
 
ν eiτ = ν ejt .

...(3.3.1)
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We shall demonstrate
  presently why it is indeed also implausible to assume
that the weights ν ejt will somehow satisfy equation (3.3.1).
From an intuitive viewpoint, it is very convenient to analyze uncertain cash
ﬂows using the notions of “expected value”, “variance” etc., that are associated
with some probability measure. We shall therefore now introduce an exogenous
measure π on the state space S, that may be conveniently considered as given
objective probabilities. Needless to say, the subjective probability assessments
of agents need not agree with π (most of our arguments are not substantially
changed if π is interpreted not as objective probabilities, but as the sujbective
probabilities of the analyst or of the decision-maker). We want to analyze the
structure of the worth of prospects with respect to the measure π. Formally,
let π be deﬁned on S so that

π (s) = 1,
π (s)  0,
s∈S

and

  
π (s) .
π eit =
s∈eit

We shall restrict our attention to events with positive probability, so that
 
π eit > 0,
Kt

 
π eit = 1

for all t ∈ T.

i=1

 
We shall also assume that for all these non-null evetns ν eit > 0. This is
essentially a requirement that for any non-null event there should be at least
some rational agent that also subjectibely assigns to it a positive probability.
If π is the subjective assessment of an active decision maker, this requirement
holds automatically.
The deﬁnition of π implies well deﬁned probability distributions for all cash
ﬂows. Note, however that the existence of probability distributions and net
worth values for all cash ﬂows does not imply a well deﬁned mapping from
probability distributions at given time points to the net present worth of these
distributions. In fact, two cash ﬂows with identical marginal probability distributions may have widely diﬀering net worth values.4 On the basis of the
4 For

example, consider two unions S 1 and S 2 of events at t such that


 
 
π eit =
π eit ,
eit ∈S 1

and

eit ∈S 2




 
 
ν eit =
ν eit .,

eit ∈S 1

eit ∈S 2

Clearly this is possible unless ν is indentically equal to π - a case which will be shown later
to be implausible and uninteresting. Now consider two uncertain cash ﬂows at t: one takes
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discussion to this point it is not clear whether the joint distribution of a concrete cash ﬂow with all other available cash ﬂows is suﬃcient to determine its
worth (in section V we shall see that under some additional restrictions deﬁned
by the notion of a “risk averse market” this joint distribution is a plausible
starting point for empirical analysis of worth).
In the analysis of the worth of cash ﬂows relative to a given measure π, we
expect a return contingent on a likely event to be worth more than a similar
return contingent on an unlikely event. The valuation of contingent returns net
of the time element and of probability will prove very important in our analysis.
Formally, deﬁne random variables {βt , t ∈ T } by
 
 i  ν eit
βt et =  i  ,
...(3.3.2)
π et
 
so that βt eit is the ratio of the present worth of a cash ﬂow at time t
contingent eit to the present worth of a riskless cash ﬂow at the same time and
with the same expected value.5
 
We can use β to demonstrate that the market weights ν eit cannot serve as
surrogate probabilities, and that the violation of (3.3.1) is not inconsistent with
the rational behaviour. Consider, for example, an extremely idealized situation
where all investors are the same, their assessment of the probabilities is π and
they maximize the expected value of an additive utility. Then by the classical
Lagrangean analysis, for any i and j we must have
 i     j 
 i
π
et u ω et
q et
  =      ,
...(3.3.3)
q ejt
π ejt u ω eit
where
 u is the utility of wealth (assumed the only argument of this function
and ω eit the investors’ wealth in the event eit . But
 
 
q eit
ν ei
  =  t ,
q ejt
ν ejt
and hence
 
  
β eit
u ω ei
  =   t  .
β ejt
u ω ejt

...(3.3.4)

the value 1 on S 1 and 0 elsewhere, and the other takes the value 1 on S 2 and 0 elsewhere.
These two cash ﬂows have identical probability distributions and diﬀerent net worth values.
5 To

see this, consider a prospect zt of x dollars at t contingent on eit . Clearly
 
 
q (zt ) = xq eit = xν eit ρ0 (t)
 
 
and the expected value of zt is xπ eit . The present worth of the amount xπ eit at t with
 i
certainty is naturally xπ et ρ0 (t), and the conclusion on β follows.
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In this idealized situation any meaningful “surrogate” probabilities must
 
 
actually equal π. But with non linear utility we must have β eit = β ejt
 
 
whenever ω eit = ω ejt , so that β is not identically 1, ν cannot equal π, and
cannot therefore be a meaningful surrogate. To see that ν cannot be expected
tobe”probabilities” in the sense of (3.3.1), suppose that under the same model
ω eit can
 take only one
 of the values
 A
 (e.g. aﬄuence)
  or R (e.g. recession).
Let β eit = βA if ω eit = A and β eit = βR if ω eit = R. Recall that τ > t,
and let SA denote the (non null) union of all states eiτ such that eiτ ⊂ ejt and
ωτi = A, and similarly for SR . Now rewrite (3.3.1)
if

n

∪

i=m

eiτ = ejt

then

n
 

 
ν eit = ν ejt ,

...(3.3.1)

i=m

and note that
   
 
ν ejt = π ejt β ejt
and

n

 
ν eiτ = π (SA ) βA + π (SR ) βR .
i=m

 
By deﬁnition π (SA ) βA + π (SR ) = π ejt , and since both are assumed
 
strictly positive, β ejt must lie strictly between βA and βR to satisfy (3.3.1).
 
But by assumption β ejt is either βA or βR , so that (in this case) the requirements are not met.

3.4

Evaluating Prospects by their Probabilistic Properties

To see how the worth is expressed in terms of the probabilities, rewrite equation
(3.2.2) as
Kt

     
...(3.4.1)
π eit β eit zt eit ,
q (zt ) = ρ0 (t)
i=1

which by deﬁnition is equivalent to
q (z) = ρ0 (t) E [z.β] ,

...(3.4.2)

where E [.] denotes the expectation operator. Hence
q (zt ) = ρ0 (t) {E [zt ] E [βt ] + cov [zt , βt ]} .

...(3.4.3)

Let σ [.] denote the standard deviation and r [., .] denote the coeﬃcient of
linear correlation, so that cov [zt , βt ] = r [zt , βt ] σ [zt ] σ [βt ]. Note also that from
(3.3.2) E [βt ] = 1. Now (3.4.3) becomes
q (zt ) = ρ0 (t) {E [zt ] + cov [zt , βt ]} ,
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or
...(3.4.4)
q (zt ) = ρ0 (t) {E [zt ] + σ [βt ] σ [zt ] r [zt , βt ]} .
 i
Generally, zt et may take positive values in some events eit and negative
values in other events, so that E [zt ] may be zero. Prospects in the securities
market, however,
 typically represent cash ﬂows with non-negative contingent
cash returns zt eit (e.g. stocks, bonds etc.) and with positive expected values.
Then
σ [zt ]
r [zt , βt ] .
q (zt ) = ρ0 (t) E [zt ] 1 + σ [βt ]
...(3.4.5)
E [zt ]
Let
α (zt ) = 1 + σ [βt ]

σ [zt ]
r [zt , βt ] ,
E [zt ]

...(3.4.6)

and recall the deﬁnition (3.1.2.) of ρ0 (t). Substituting these into (3.4.5) we
get the very familiar form of the net present market worth
q (zt ) =

E [zt ] α (zt )
t .
(1 + i0t )

...(3.4.7)

The importance of the result here lies in the precise deﬁnition in (3.4.6) of
the way α depends on the probabilistic characteristic of the cash ﬂow z. This
may be summarized as follows: there exists a market variable β, such that the
worth of any uncertain cash ﬂow z —relative to a riskless cash ﬂow with the same
expected value—depends only on the coeﬃcient of variation of z, σ [z] /E [z] and
the coeﬃcient of linear correlation of z with β, but not any other moments (and
thus, for example, also not on the skewness of the distribution of z). All uncertain cash ﬂows uncorrelated with β are evaluated at the riskless rate. The result
does not depend on the rist attitudes of agents, their probability assessments, or
the distribution of wealth among investors.6

3.5

“Risky” Interest Rates

In the terminology of business ﬁnance it is customary to condider the “cost of
risky capital” as the interest rate at which the expected value of an uncertain
cash ﬂow should be discounted to get its present worth. That is, given a single
uncertain cash ﬂow zt with given worth q (zt ), we deﬁne the risky rate k (zt )
applicable to zt by
q (zt ) =

E (zt )
[1 + k (zt )]

t.

...(3.5.1)

Note, that the uncertain cash ﬂow zt and its worth q (zt ) are not suﬃcient
to deﬁne the applicable rate k (zt ). Since k (zt ) is deﬁned by (3.5.1), where zt
appears through E [zt ], the measure π used to evaluate E [zt ] is implicit in the
6 See also Sharpe [13] and Lintner [9]. Our result here resembles that of Sharpe in the
evaluation of “residual” or “unsystematic” variances. The relationship between and both
Sharpe’s and Lintner’s “market return” will become clear in section V.

Beja

The Economically Relevant Partition of the State-Space

9

deﬁnition of k (zt ). Even if there is perfect information on the prospect speciﬁcation of zt , there need not be agreement among investors as to the appropriate
rate k (zt ), since individuals may diﬀer in their assessments of probability. Unlike the riskless rate i0t , which is a market variable, the risky rate k (zt ) is
deﬁned relative to a probability measure π. The same is true, of course, of the
coeﬃcient α (zt ).
Combining (3.5.1) with (3.4.7) we have the identity
1
α (zt )
t =
t
(1 + i0t )
[1 + k (zt )]
or

−1/t

1 + k (zt ) = (1 + i0t ) [α (zt )]

,

and thus the “risky rate” k (zt ) is greater, equal, or smaller than the riskless rate i0t according to whether α (zt ) is less, equal or greater than 1, or,
equivalently, according to whether zt is negatively correlated, uncorrelated, or
positively correlated with βt . Clearly in the degenerate case when βt is constant
(and then necessarily equal to 1) α (zt ) = 1 and k (zt ) = i0t for all zt , which
makes the case irrelevant for our interests. It is easy to see that in all other
cases all three relations between k (zt ) and i0t hold.

4

The Economically Relevant Partition of the
State-Space

In some cases it is more convenient to use a “state-space-model” for the evaluation of prospects, rather than the concise representation in terms of the probabilistic properties of these prospects. Recall, however, that the events eit in our
original state-space have been assumed to represent all information available at
time t, and that the cash ﬂows of all prospects, contingent on those events, are
therefore well deﬁned numbers. The implications of this requirement on the dimension of the state-space has been our main motive for the use of probabilities.
If a “state-space-model”
  isto be used, it is interesting to investigate whether the
complete listing of z eit can be somehow avoided, using a coarser partition
and less data. We shall now see that the detailed partition of the state-space
is “economically irrelevant”, and that a coarser partition can indeed be used
eﬀectively. This partition is achieved
  by lumping together, for each t, all states
eit that have the same value of β eit . Formally, let for any t ∈ T
Ωjt ,

j = 1...mt

be a partition of S, such that
if

eit ∈ Ωjt

then elt ∈ Ωjt

if and only if

 
 
β elt = β eit .
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Note that β Ωjt = β eit for eit ∈ Ωjt is well deﬁned. Recall that any
prospect z can be written as the sum of single-cash-ﬂow-prospects zt occurring
each at some time t and that, by linearity

q (zt ) .
q (z) =
t∈T

Now recall (3.4.1),
q (zt ) = ρ0 (t)

Kt


     
π eit β eit z eit ,

i=1

which can be rewritten as
q (zt ) = ρ0 (t)

mt


      
β Ωjt
π eit z eit ,

j=1

q (zt ) = ρ0 (t)

mt


eit ∈Ωjt

  
     
β Ωjt π Ωjt
π eit | Ωjt z eit ,

j=1

q (zt ) = ρ0 (t)

eit ∈Ωjt
mt



   
β Ωjt π Ωjt E zt | Ωjt .

...(4.1)

j=1




where π eit | Ωjt is the conditional probability of eit , given Ωjt , and E zt | Ωjt
is the conditional expectaton of zt , given Ωjt . Now (4.1) is analogous to (3.4.1),
and the mega-events Ωjt replace the events eit . The signiﬁcant feature in this
coarse partition is that any variation of zt within a mega-event does not aﬀect
the worth, as long as the conditional expecation is unchanged. Within the megaevents, then, the expected value acts as an eﬀective-certainty-equivalent. It is
easy to see that the suggested partition is the coarsest partition that satisﬁes
this, and it can therefore be termed the economically relevant partition of the
state-space.

5
5.1

Market Risk Aversion
Risk Aversion in a Market Sense

The analysis above served to indicate the importance of the variable β for the
valuation of prospects. Note, however, that β is not directly observable, but
a composition of the market weights ν and the probabilities π. The technical
diﬃculties in inferring β on one hand, and its prime role in the worth of capital assets on the other, thus suggest the desirability of an eﬀective economic
observable surrogate of β.
Recall the special case described above where
all agents are the same. We

have noted in (3.3.4) that in this case β eit is proportional to the marginal
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utility, and thus a well-deﬁned function of wealth. If, in addition,
  investors are
also assumed risk averse, β decreases as ω increases, with β eit highest for the
most adverse events and lowest for events of greatest aﬄuence.7
This relation between β and ω may hold even if all restrictive assumptions
concerning the market are dropped. This may be informally interpreted as
though market behaviour is being dominated by risk averse investors, who behave “rationally” with respect to the measure π. If we wish to restrict the
analysis to market variables, we may avoid any statement concerning the behaviour of individuals, and use the relation between β and ω to deﬁne risk
aversion in a market sense: a market, as represented by the worth functional
q, is said to be risk averse (relative to a given measure π) if, for all t, β is
monotone decreasing with the overall level of social aﬄuence8 under the various
events at that time.
Some words of caution may be in order here. First, note that avoiding any
statement about individuals in the deﬁnition of risk averse marekts does indeed
leave the term non-restrictive in this respect. In fact all agents in a risk averse
market may be risk seekers, and, conversely, all agents may be risk averse and
the market may still fail to qualify as risk averse. These extreme situations
may, however, be ligitimately considered as far fetched. Second, note that
the deﬁnition of risk averse marekts does not involve a comparison of social
aﬄuence at diﬀerent time points, but only over diﬀerent events at the same
time. Finally, we may take into account diﬀerent histories preceding diﬀerent
events by a suﬃciently ﬂexible deﬁnition of aﬄuence. If the eﬀect of the history
preceding a certain time point on the attitudes of (inﬂuential) investors towards
their marginal dollar income at that time is signiﬁcant, then the deﬁnition of
aﬄuence may not be restricted to spot variables such as the G.N.P., but must
also include some summary of the relevant history. The operational choice in
every speciﬁc case will naturally depend in part on empirical considerations.
Some well known phenomena tend to support the position that most observed capital markets tend to satisfy our deﬁnition of risk averse marekts.
First note that a state of overall aﬄuence is deﬁned as an event under which
most investmetns in real assets pay oﬀ highly. Therefore, by deﬁnition, most
investments and corporate securities have higher returns in aﬄuent events than
in adverse events. If the market is risk averse, then the returns of most of these
assets will be negatively correlated with β, their certainty equivalents lower then
the expected values, and their worth lower than that of riskless returns with the
same expected value. The fact that the worth of most risky assets is indeed
lower than the worth of riskless assets with the same expected return, or equivalently that the “required rate of return” on risky assets is predominantly higher
than the riskless rate thus supports the hypothesis of risk averse markets.
Secondly, consider the opposite phenomenon of prospects with higher returns
7 We shall deliberately avoid the issue of precise deﬁnition, or measurement, of social aﬄuence.
8 The precise operational meaning of the deﬁnition of market risk aversion will therefore
depend on the precise scale chosen to represent social aﬄuence.
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primarily in adverse events. This is basically a phenomenon of “insurance” —
more widely recognized on the level of individuals than of society as a whole.
Flood control systems, the storage of food reserves, or air-raid shelters all fall
in that category. In a risk averse market, investments of this type will be
undertaken even if their expected yield is lower than the riskless rate. It is well
known that in practice they are indeed frequently undertaken.9

5.2

Surrogates of β

Any observable variable may serve as a surrogate of β if it can conveniently
replace β in (3.4.6). Thus, the power of some variable H, say, as a surrogate of
β is determined by the validity of the equation
q (zt ) =

1
t {E [zt ] + Aσ [zt ] r [zt , H]} ,
(1 + i0t )

...(5.2.1)

where A is a constant. H is a perfect surrogate of βt if (5.2.1) holds for all
conceivable prospects zt .
In a risk averse market, it is natural to search for some observable measure
of social aﬄuence as a surrogate of β, since a monotone relation is presumed.
Now if, for some measure H of social aﬄuence, the monotone relation is also
linear, namely if
β = a0 − a1 H,

...(5.2.2)

then clearly H is a perfect surrogate. It can be shown without diﬃculty that
(5.2.2) is also a necessary condition for a perfect surrogate. In the restrictive
context of (3.3.4), the linearity in (5.2.2) is equivalent to the utility function
being quadratic in H.

6

Concluding Remarks

One of the basic issues of corporate policy under uncertainty may be summarized
as follows: given a perfect market where all agents are risk averse, should a
corporation, wishing to maximize its market worth, adopt a risk averse policy—
reﬂecting the tastes of its shareholders—or a risk neutral policy—taking into
account the fact that shareholders can always diversify their own investments.
9 See, for example, also Arrow [1] and Hirshleifer [8]. The fact that “social insurance”
investments are in practice undertaken almost exclusively by government and do not stand to
the market test is disturbing. A possible reason is that in states of extreme distress “the rules”
change. It is inconceivable that society would tolerate private control of a vital commodity
under “national emergency” and calmly pay “supply and demand” prices rather than use the
power of law and police, and perhaps pay a compensation in terms of cost. Thus, a police
force is an integral part of any “social insurance investment”, and since the police force is
an exclusive prerogative of government, so are these investments. The fact that they are not
traded in the market is in no way an indication of their value in terms of market worth as
prospects.
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One answer indicated by our analysis is that corporate risk averse behaviour in
the context of worth maximization is never “variance avoiding” per se . Essential
to the notion of worth maximization is not the reduction of overall corporate
variance but of best “ﬁt” to the cost of capital q. This agrees of course, with the
notion of stockholders’ diversiﬁcation of investments: even if shareholders wish
to avoid the overall variances in their portfolios, they need not be concerned
with the variance of any one particular ﬁrm.
The other part of the same answer indicates that shareholders’ investment
diversiﬁcation does not imply corporate “expected-value-maximization”: the
worth of capital assets was shown to be not independent of the variance. In
terms of shareholders’ preferences this means that there are some types of variances from which shareholders cannot eﬀectively protect themselves by diversiﬁcation: this is the social risk, as opposed to corporate risk. In broad terms,
then, corporate behaviour in perfect capital markets should be averse to social
risk, but indiﬀerent to any corporate risks beyond the social risk.
In a risk averse market, we can be more speciﬁc in the identiﬁcation of the
two risks. The analysis of section V indicates that corporate policy should be indiﬀerent to variances originating from transfer of assets from one corporation to
another, but averse to variances in the utilization of natural resources. Corporations should thus perhaps tend to maximize expected value in problems such
as inventory control, maintenance procedures etc., but tend to be more “conservative” in substantial expansion of production capacity, which contributes
considerably to overall social wealth.
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